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Equator Principles III: A Hard Look at Soft Law
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 15, 2012, the Equator Principles Association
released a draft of the much-anticipated Equator Principles III (EP III),I
the latest edition of the voluntary guidelines for international project
finance.2 First developed in 2003, 3 the Equator Principles (EPs) are
designed to provide a voluntary framework to help manage the social
and environmental risks associated with international project finance in
developing countries.4 This framework embodies the concept of "soft
law," defined as voluntary, informal guidelines that carry no legal
obligation. 5  "Equator Principles" refers to the broader theoretical
framework that is embodied in specific versions designated as EP 1, EP
II, and EP III. Since their creation and subsequent revision the EPs
have been met with mixed reviews; 6 Equator Principles Financial
1. Equator Principles III - Draft and Summary of Key Changes, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES
ASS'N, http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/EPIII_PACKAGE.pdf [hereinafter EP
III (Draft)] (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
2. The Equator Principles site defines project finance as a "method of funding in
which the lender looks primarily to the revenues generated by a single project, both as the
source of repayment and as security for the exposure." This type of funding is frequently
used in large-scale infrastructure projects in developing countries. What is Project
Finance?, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS'N, http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about-ep/faqs/42-about/frequently-asked-questions/18 (last visited
Jan. 30, 2013).
3. History of the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS'N,
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about/history-of-the-eps (last visited Jan. 30,
2013).
4. See Thomas Papadopoulos, The Greening of Project Finance: Is This a Viable
Project'?, 7 ICFAI U. J. OF BANKING L. 8, 9-12 (2009).
5. See Anna Gelpem, Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Principles on
Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, AMERICAN UNIV., WCL
RESEARCH PAPER (Apr. 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2041027.
6. Compare Bold Steps Forward, BANKTRACK 1 (Jan. 10, 2010),
http://www.banktrack.org/download/bold-stepsforward/100 114_civilsocietycallequator
_principles.pdf (expressing disappointment with the current lack of transparency,
accountability, and progress in the EPs), with Mehrdad Nazari, Are Equator Principles Still
Relevant After Rio +20 and UN PRI?, PRIZMA (June 17, 2012, 9:09 PM) (stating that the EPs
have become the de facto standard for managing social and environmental risks),
http://prizmablog.com/2012/06/17/are-equator-principles-still-relevant-after-rio2O-and-un-
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Institutions (EPFIs) 7 point to increased membership in the EPs8 as
evidence of their impact and efficacy, while non-governmental
organizations (NGOs)9 have lamented the lack of institutional
transparency and implementation mechanisms embodied in the EP
versions thus far.' 0
The perceived deficiencies, as well as the oft-touted increase in
membership, in the EP framework can be traced to the inherent
characteristics of soft law itself. Soft law lends itself to the area of
project finance because the actors and locales are continually changing.
The broadly phrased guidelines of the Equator Principles, as well as the
general lack of legal liability, means that banks can tailor the Principles
to fit a wide variety of projects operating under a broad swath of
different countries' systems of governance or legal regimes."
However, it is this easy access and malleability that has led NGOs to
decry soft law as lacking the enforcement power necessary to police the
financial institutions involved in project finance.12 The debate about the
Equator Principles' efficacy can easily be seen as a proxy for discussion
about the effectiveness of soft law in bringing social and environmental
awareness to international business transactions. Other soft law
pri/.
7. An EPFI is defined as "a financial institution that adopts the Equator Principles
(EPs) and is active in Project Finance or Project Finance Advisory Services." To be an
"active" member an EPFI must either have EP-related financing currently on the books, or
have plans to finance EP-govemed projects in the near future. See What is an Equator
Principles Financial Institution?, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS'N, http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about-ep/faqs/42-about/frequently-asked-questions/59 (last visited
Jan. 27, 2013).
8. Over 80% of international project finance is conducted under the EPs.
Papadopoulos, supra note 4, at 11.
9. The term "NGOs" refers to groups that advocate increased corporate responsibility
in the realm of environmental and social harms, with Greenpeace being a prominent and
well-known example. These groups protest companies and projects that they feel are not
sufficiently mindful of social and environmental impacts. See generally Niamh O'Sullivan
& Brendan O'Dwyer, Stakeholder perspectives on a financial sector legitimation process:
The case of NGOs and the Equator Principles, 22 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J.
553 (2009).
10. Lack of transparency and subsequent lack of accountability mechanisms is
described as the EPs' "fatal flaw." Andrea Durbin, NGO Comments on the Proposed
Revision of the Equator Principles, BANKTRACK 8 (Apr. 26, 2006),
http://www.banktrack.org/download/equator-principles-ii-ngo comments/0-060428 epii-
ngopositionpaper_publicversionfinal.pdf.
11. See Richard Macve & Xiaoli Chen, The "Equator Principles": a Success for
Voluntary Codes?, 23 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 890, 891 (2010).
12. O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 567-68.
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initiatives, such as the UN's PRI or the recent Rio +20 global summit,
might offer a tempting alternative to the Equator Principles, but
similarly carry the same inherent weaknesses of all soft law regimes .
3
This Note provides a brief overview of the Equator Principles,
highlights the proposed changes in the EPs, and analyzes whether the
EPs will remain relevant. This examination focuses on the broad
themes consistently present in the Equator Principles conversation,
leaving a particularized treatment of the individual enumerated
principles for a later discussion. Part II provides an illustrative case
study from the early days of the Equator Principles to show the
inconsistent results that have typified the EPs thus far.' 4  Part III
examines the history and impact of the initial version of the Equator
Principles (EP I) and its subsequent revision in Equator Principles II
(EP II).15  Part IV provides a point-by-point comparison between
proposed changes that outside observers put forth for EP III and the
actual provisions outlined in that version's draft. 16 Part V examines
how the Part II case study would likely turn out under EP III,1 7 and Part
VI focuses on the feasibility and sustainability of the EPs going
forward.' 8 Finally, the Note concludes with a frank assessment of the
Equator Principle's role in international project finance. 19
II. SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN SOUTH AMERICA
A controversial 2006 project involving a Uruguayan paper pulp
mill powerfully illustrates the promise and limitations of the Equator
Principles: the EPs provide a symbolic promise of responsibility, to
which local NGOs refer in their publicity campaigns, but the lack of
enforcement mechanisms mean that their efforts to force accountability
may ultimately be in vain.20  The local borrower promised that the
project, a mill to be built along the River Uruguay, would provide
13. See Nazari, supra note 6.
14. See infra, Part II.
15. See infra, Part 1II.
16. See infra, Part IV.
17. See infra, Part V.
18. See infra, Part Vt.
19. See infra, Part VII.
20. See generally Vivian Lee, Enforcing the Equator Principles: An NGO's Principled
Effort to Stop the Financing of a Paper Pulp Mill in Uruguay, 6 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 354
(2008).
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significant financial benefits to the neighboring area. Uruguay's
neighboring country, Argentina, was worried about the possibility of
pollution along the shared River Uruguay, particularly since the
Argentines would not share in the proposed financial benefits from the
project. 2  The facility was to be placed in close proximity to two
population centers, the cities of Fray Bentos in Uruguay and
Gualeguaychu in Argentina.23 The risks associated with the paper
mill's construction included noise and air pollution, water
contamination from the manufacturing process, and an industrializing of
what was formerly considered a pristine environment.24  In
Gualeguaychu the primary concern was over the mill's impact on the
local tourist industry, the primary means of income for the local
population, since the mill would produce foul odors and industrial
runoff.25 The problem was more acute in Fray Bentos, a Uruguayan city
of over 35,000 people situated less than a mile from the mill site.26 Not
only would the paper mill extract an average of 86 million cubic meters
of water per day (equivalent to what the city uses every month) from the
river, it also would dump the water and chemicals used in the pulping
process back into the river, upstream from the place that Fray Bentos
drew its water supply. 27  The industrial byproducts of the pulping
process include dioxins (organic pollutants that have been tied to
environmental and health problems) 28 as well as airborne emissions of
carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide (the chemical responsible for acid
rain).29
21. The mill was expected to increase Uruguay's GDP by over 2 percent ($350
million) per year, while employing 300 people directly and over 2,200 people indirectly. Id.
at 360.
22. Id.
23. Botnia and ENCE Pulp Paper Mills Uruguay, BANKTRACK 3 (Oct. 2005),
http://www.banktrack.org/download/botnia and-ence_pulppaper-millsuruguay/051001_i
nvestorbriefingbotnia ence.pdf [hereinafter Paper Mills].
24. Dodgy Deals - Botnia Pulp and Paper Mill, BANKTRACK,
http://www.banktrack.org/show/dodgydeals/botniapulp and_paper-mill#tab-dodgydeals_i
ssues (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Dodgy Deals].
25. Id.
26. Paper Mills, supra note 23, at 3.
27. Id.
28. The risks associated with dioxins include miscarriages, birth defects, liver damage,
and neurological impairment. There is a risk of dioxins being concentrated in fish and other
wildlife, then being passed on to the humans that later ingest them. Paper Mills, supra note
23, at 5.
29. Id. at 6.
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A local NGO, the Center for Human Rights and Environment
(CEDHA), 30 attempted to use numerous alleged violations of the
Equator Principles31 to launch a public relations campaign against the
EPFI financing construction of the mill. 32  The bulk of CEDHA's
complaints regarded the complete lack of communication between the
project's leaders and the surrounding communities and affected
populations, as well as a perceived indifference to the impact that the
new industrial site would have on the existing economic environment.
33
In a seemingly positive example of the EPs effectiveness, CEDHA's
public shaming was successful in forcing the initial lender, ING, to
withdraw from the project altogether. 34 CEDHA's victory was short-
lived, however, as Calyon, another EP signatory bank, stepped in to
restore financing to the project.35 CEDHA, faced with Calyon's refusal
to withdraw funding from the mill project,36 failed to elicit more than a
perfunctory declaration from an International Finance Corporation
(IFC) 37 oversight board that the project borrower had not initially
conformed to the EPs procedural requirements. 38  This failure was
quickly remedied, and the mill project was completed on schedule.39
While it may have been easy to remedy the borrower's failure to
conduct environmental and social impact surveys, CEDHA and local
30. Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente is an Argentinian non-profit group
centered on human rights and preserving environmental resources. Mission and Activities,
CENTRO DE DERECHOES HUMANOS Y AMBIENTE,
http://wp.cedha.net/?page_id=6271 &lang=en (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
31. CEDHA alleged that the project borrower had violations under Principles 1
(deficient environmental and social screening), 2 (inadequate Environmental Impact
Assessment), 3 (inadequate consideration of numerous environmental hazards associated
with running the mill), 4 (failure to prepare an Environmental Management Plan), and 5
(lack of consultation between borrowers and the community) of the original Equator
Principles. See Lee, supra note 20, at 363-64.
32. CEDHA sent numerous letters to the two EPFIs associated with the project, citing
the various infractions and the subsequent environmental impact on the area. See id. at 361.
33. Paper Mills, supra note 23, at 8.
34. Lee, supra note 20, at 364.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 365.
37. The IFC is the private sector branch of the World Bank, focused on private
development in developing countries. It has 184 member countries, and provides funding as
well as advisory services for projects in over 100 developing countries. See About IFC,
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION,
http://wwwl.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp ext-content/ifc-extemal-corporate site/about+
ifc (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
38. Id. at 369-70.
39. See id at 370.
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stakeholders felt that the damage those surveys meant to prevent had
already been wrought. To these observers it seemed that the procedural
requirements of an environmental assessment and stakeholder
engagement were not meant to stop problematic projects, but rather
were intended to provide criteria that a project borrower could check off
on the way to building harmful ventures. CEDHA and other observers
lamented the lack of enforcement mechanisms in the EPs, 40 and the
Uruguay paper mill became a symbol for the inability of the EPs to
effect real change.4'
III. ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES
A. EPI
In 2003 the Equator Principles arose from a coordinated effort
42
between international lending institutions43 and the IFC to implement a
framework to manage the social and environmental risks associated
with financing projects in developing countries.44 These projects range
from power plants to copper mines to water treatment facilities.45 The
need for such a framework was apparent, as the withdrawal of the
International Monetary Fund from international project finance had left
a vacuum that private investors were rapidly filling.46 These investors
faced rising criticism from environmentally-conscious NGOs who
40. Id. at 373.
41. See Durbin, supra note 10, at 7.
42. See History of the Equator Principles, supra note 3.
43. The original signatories of the Equator Principles were ABN AMRO, Barclays,
Citigroup, WestLB, Credit Lyonnais, Credit Suisse First Boston, Hypo Vereinsbank,
Rabobank, The Royal Bank of Scotland, and Westpac. See O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra
note 9, at 364-65.
44. The impetus for the creation of the EPs arose from several notorious infrastructure
projects that created environmental and humanitarian crises. Notable among these was the
development of the Three Gorges Dam in China. See Macve & Chen, supra note 11, at 892.
45. The draft of EP III provides some examples of covered projects: "a power plant,
mine, oil and gas Project (including drill ships and Floating Production Storage and
Offloading (FPSO) vessels), chemical plant, infrastructure development, manufacturing
plant, large scale real estate development." See EP 111 (Draft), supra note 1, at 15.
46. The IMF withdrew from project finance due to the high-profile protests that NGOs
were coordinating against such projects. Prior to IMF's withdrawal the organization had
imposed environmental and social standards on projects in developing countries; the
withdrawal of the IMF marked the corresponding withdrawal of these explicit safeguards.
See John Conley & Cynthia Williams, Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?:
The Equator Principles, 33 L. & POL'Y 542, 543-44 (2011).
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feared that private investment firms would introduce a brand of ruthless
capitalism into developing countries' infrastructure projects.47 As a
result, the primary targets of the NGOs' efforts, large international
financial institutions, agreed to voluntarily impose limitations and
guidelines for their project financing efforts. 48  The standards that
emerged were pinned to the IFC's own Performance Standards 49 and
contained a set of nine principles designed to mitigate the social and
environmental risks associated with project financing.50 Any project
that rose above the threshold of $50 million51 would fall into one of
three risk categories, depending on the magnitude of the concern.
Category A was for projects "with potential significant adverse social or
environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or unprecedented;"
Category B was for projects "with potential limited adverse social or
environmental impacts that are few in number, generally site specific,
largely reversible, and readily addressed through mitigation measures;"
Category C was for projects "with minimal or no social or
environmental impacts." 52  Projects that were deemed to carry a
substantial risk were required to undergo increased scrutiny and
reporting requirements in order to insure any environmental or social
hazards were eliminated or mitigated.53  These requirements were
enforced by loan covenants that tied the project's financing to borrower
compliance. While these covenants seemed to create a method of
enforcement, the nature of the project loans (where the lender was paid
back by the proceeds of the completed project) meant that EPFIs were
more likely to bring the project up to minimum standards than to cancel
the venture altogether.
At first glance, the newly minted EP I appeared to be a
promising step towards increased social responsibility in the
47. Id. at 544.
48. Id.
49. See History of the Equator Principles, supra note 3.
50. The EPs define project financing as "a method of funding in which the lender looks
primarily to the revenues generated by a single Project, both as the source of repayment and
as security for the exposure." EP Ill (Draft), supra note 1, at 15.
51. Andreas Missbach, The Equator Principles: Drawing the Line for Socially
Responsible Banks? An Interim Review from an NGO Perspective, 47 DEV. no. 3, 2004 at
79.
52. Jane Andrew, The Equator Principles, Project Finance and the Challenge of Social
and Environmental Responsibility, 1 IssuEs IN Soc. & ENvTL. ACCT. 1, 5-6 (2007).
53. See id. at 6.
2013]
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international finance community, a development for which NGOs and
industry observers had waited a long time.54 It quickly became
apparent, however, that EP I did not have the level of impact that many
NGOs and stakeholders had initially hoped.55 The standards did not
include a review body,56 formal transparency or implementation
requirements,57  or mandated compliance procedures.58  These
limitations meant that there was no way for observers to determine how
thoroughly or honestly EPFIs were adopting the EP I standards. 59 The
perceived shortcomings also led many critics of EP I to assert that
EPFIs were only signing onto the EPs for public relations purposes,
without any real desire to implement social or environmental safeguards
in their lending practices. 60  The lack of an effective grievance
mechanism presented another set of difficulties, as EP I did not provide
a procedure for affected populations and stakeholders to address
concerns with the EPFIs responsible for a project's financing. 61
To many, it seemed that the EPs were not meant to effect real
environmental and social change, but instead were simply an internal
mechanism EPFIs were using to limit their own risk exposure62 while
garnering praise for apparent socially responsible behavior.63  The
NGOs who had exerted public pressure on international lending
institutes to be more socially responsible64 believed that the EPFIs'
promises of substantial change had lulled watchdog groups into a false
sense of achievement, 65 especially since several EPFIs continued to
fund projects that seemingly violated both the letter and spirit of the
EPs.6 6 Cases such as the paper pulp mill in Uruguay were neither
54. See Macve & Chen, supra note 11, at 892.
55. See generally Missbach, supra note 51.
56. Andrew, supra note 52, at 6.
57. Andrea Durbin, supra 10, at 8 (describing lack of transparency and accountability
mechanisms as the EPs "fatal flaw").
58. O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 571.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Lee, supra note 20, at 361.
62. Since project loans are often financed by the proceeds of the project itself, any
delay due to labor strife or environmental sanctions would necessarily limit the ability of
EPFIs to recoup their investment. See id. at 362.
63. O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 571.
64. Conley & Williams, supra note 46, at 558.
65. O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 570.
66. See id. at 570-71 (referencing the Baku-Tablisi-Ceyhan and Sakhalin II pipeline
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remarkable nor isolated,67 leading to cries for changes to the freshly-
adopted EP I.
B. EP H
In 2006, after three years of observation, suggestions, and
feedback, the EPs underwent their first revision when the EPFIs and the
IFC agreed to revise the Principles in parallel to the IFC's own update
process.68 This modification was due to a change in the IFC's safeguard
policies 69 rather than as a direct result of vocal complaints about EP I.
70
The result, dubbed EP 11,71 increased the scope and ambition of the
Equator Principles in several fundamental ways.
1. Scope of Coverage
Not only was the monetary threshold for EP application lowered
from $50 million to $10 million, the scope of the framework was
extended from pure project finance to include project advisory activities
as well.72 Project advisory activities are "the provision of advice on the
potential financing of a development where one of the options may be
Project Finance., 73  The lowering of the financing threshold was
implemented in part to increase the number of projects that would fall
under the EPs; not only was this a proactive approach to increase the
reach of the EPs, it was also a reaction to the reality that many EPFIs
had already voluntarily adopted a lower threshold for their own lending
practices.74 Similarly, the extension to project advising was meant to
projects).
67. See generally Durbin, supra note 10.
68. See About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS'N, http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
69. The IFC's safeguard policies are the environmental and social restrictions that the
organization puts on its own lending practices into developing countries. The EPs closely
mirror the IFC's guidelines, but whereas the EPs' members are comprised of private lending
institutions, the IFC is made up of sovereign countries. See About IFC, supra note 43.
70. O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 573.
71. The Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES Ass'N (June 2006),
http://www.equator-principles.com/resourceslequator-principles.pdf [hereinafter EP II].
72. Id. at 2.
73. EPIII(Draft), supranote 1, at 13.
74. See PAUL Q. WATCHMAN ET AL., LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE, WHY
HARD-NOSED BANKERS ARE ADOPTING SOFT LAW PRINCIPLES 9 (Jan. 2007),
2013]
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not only increase the number of candidate projects, but also to reflect
the fact that member banks had been spreading the framework of the
EPs to other financial transactions and products. 75 The new provisions
of EP II also applied to both new projects and extensions of existing
projects where the social or environmental impact of the upgrade was
significant.7 6 An extension that was deemed to create a "significant"
impact would necessitate a re-assessment of the entire project; while
this would be a costly expenditure, the heightened "significant"
standard probably was expected to affect only a few projects.77
2. Grievance Mechanisms
EP II also required that borrowers in all Category A or B
projects in non-OECD 78 or non-High Income OECD countries had to
develop and promote a grievance mechanism designed to hear, and
hopefully remedy, any concerns project-affected populations might
raise.79 This addition was in response to criticism from NGOs over the
lack of communication between affected populations and the borrowers
responsible for the environmental and social harms that are often the
result of large industrial projects. 80 This change, along with additional
consultation requirements, 81 meant that there was a higher level of
meaningful interaction between the project-affected population and the
borrower than under EP I.
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/ClientBriefingforEquatorPrinciples2007-02-
07.pdf.
75. Id. at 10-11.
76. EPII, supra note 71, at 2.
77. WATCHMAN ET AL., supra note 74, at 12.
78. OECD refers to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, a
group whose membership is comprised of the largest economies in the world and whose aim
is "to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people
around the world." In this context, the EPs are using them as a known rubric by which to
differentiate which countries need more oversight than others. See About the OECD,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
79. EP Il, supra note 71, at 4.
80. WATCHMAN ET AL., supra note 74, at 16-17 (referencing the Sakhali II pipeline and
Uruguayan paper pulp mills).
81. Principle 5 of EP II states that projects with significant social or environmental
impacts should be accompanied by "free, prior and informed consultation" which the
borrower will communicate back to the EPFI. EP II, supra note 65, at 4.
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3. Reporting Requirements
EP II added a new Principle, Principle 10 (EPFI Reporting),82
which required all EPFIs to publish reports at least once a year detailing
their implementation of and experience with the EPs.83 The text of EP
II went on to state that, "[s]uch reporting should at a minimum include
the number of transactions screened by each EPFI, including the
categorization[sic] accorded to transactions (and may include a
breakdown by sector or region), and information regarding
implementation. 84  This new responsibility came with an important
caveat: the EPFI could amend its reporting by "taking into account
appropriate confidentiality considerations." 85 The text did not include
any additional information concerning the method of reporting or level
of required detail,86 leaving EPFIs to implement the new Principle
however they saw fit. The net effect of Principle 10 was that EPFIs
were able to point to the requirement as proof that they were fulfilling
their obligation to be transparent and open, while hiding any
questionable practices under the guise of "confidentiality
considerations."87
C. Reaction to EP 11
Responses to EP II came before the final version of the update
was even published, with NGOs complaining that drafts of the new
Principles did not do enough to remedy the perceived defects of EP 1.88
Many felt that the EPs, by lowering the threshold for coverage, were
sacrificing effectiveness for inclusiveness. 89  Some observers also
criticized the EP II's continuing reliance on IFC Performance
Standards; 90 not only was EP II pegged to those Standards, updates to
EP II could only occur in conjunction with the JFC's own review
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id.
84. EP II, supra note 71, at 6 n.6.
85. EP 1, supra note 71, at 6.
86. Id.
87. Andrew, supra note 52, at 7.
88. Durbin, supra note 10, at 3.
89. Id.
90. Bold Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 2.
2013]
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process. NGOs applauded the expansion of EP II to include advisory
functions and project expansions,9" but still felt that the EPs were being
applied too narrowly. 92 These groups emphasized that it was the size of
the project, not a particular label or method of finance that should
determine an EPFI's use of the EPs.93 Another persistent criticism was
the continuing lack of sufficient transparency and enforcement
mechanisms, a problem "as old as the Principles itself.,94 The newly-
created Principle 10 was also seen as only a half-measure, since it
allowed EPFIs to escape any true reporting "requirement" by simply
exercising their right to keep client information confidential.95
Despite the criticisms lobbed at EP II, the Equator Principles
have continued to flourish. The number of EPFIs has grown from the
original ten to now almost eighty banks and financial institutions, 96 with
approximately thirty Export Credit Agencies and fifteen European
Development Finance Institutions adopting similar measures for their
own practices. 97 These EP-adopting institutions constitute over eighty
percent of international project finance lenders,98 making the Principles
the "de facto environmental and social risk management standard"99 for
projects in developing countries. Despite their shortcomings, one
observer maintains that "the EPs clearly have improved the situation by
placing the private sector in a proactive environmental role and
strengthening the public's ability to hold the financial sector
accountable for its actions."' 00
IV. EP III
The Equator Principles Association (EPA) was created in July
2010 with the goal of facilitating the continued survival and
management of the EPs. 10' Two years later, in July 2012, the EPA
91. Durbin, supra note 10, at 5.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Bold Steps Forward, supra note 6, at 5.
95. See Andrew, supra note 52, at 7.
96. Nazari, supra note 6.
97. Id.
98. Papadopoulos, supra note 4, at 11.
99. Nazari, supra note 6.
100. Papadopoulos, supra note 4, at 12.
101. The Equator Principles Association - Governance and Management, EQUATOR
[Vol. 17
EQUA TOR PRINCIPLES III
initiated the process to create EP III with a commitment to address
many of the issues that critics of the EPs raised. 10 2 The EPA published
the draft of EP 111103 on August 13, 2012, with a planned consultation
and comment period to last at least 60 days. 104 The public comments
available as of November 1, 2012, provide a sense of the reaction to the
proposed changes. 10 5  Moreover, a useful exercise to help gauge the
depth of change the EPA has implemented with this new version is to
compare the recent additions with the suggestions and recommendations
for EP reform made by two knowledgeable observers: the collection of
NGOs known as BankTrack and the EPA-directed Strategic Review
Board.
The NGO group BankTrack 0 6 is "an international coalition of
NGOs campaigning for greater financial institution responsibility and
accountability.', 0 7  BankTrack was created in an effort to provide a
united front from which NGOs could directly engage with EPFIs and
the EPA itself.10 8 In October 2011, BankTrack published a report as
part of the update process for EP III titled "The Outside Job."'0 9 This
report detailed numerous recommendations for the latest draft of the
EPs. 10 In addition to a general exhortation for the EPs to focus more
on external community development than internal structural
PRINCIPLES Ass'N, http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about/governance-and-
management (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
102. The update was focused on, among other things, the scope of the EPs, reporting
and transparency, and stakeholder engagement during the updating process. History of the
Equator Principles, supra note 3.
103. See EP 111 (Draft), supra note 1.
104. About EP III Update Process and Timeline, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS'N,
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/ep3/process-and-timeline (last visited Jan. 20,
2013).
105. See, e.g., Client Alert, Gavin Scott et al., Ashurst Australia LLP, Equator Principles
III - New Standards for Project Financing, 3, (Aug. 15, 2012) (on file with Ashurst),
www.ashurst.com/page.aspx?id-content=8134 [hereinafter Ashurst Alert].
106. About BankTrack, BANKTRACK,
http://www.banktrack.org/show/pages/about-banktrack (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
107. O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 559.
108. Id. at 576-77.
109. Jan Willem van Gelder et al., The Outside Job: Turning the Equator Principles
Towards People and Planet, BANKTRACK (2011),
http://www.banktrack.org/download/theoutside job/ 111021 the outside-job final.pdf
(proposing several changes and recommendations intended to influence the EPs' revision
process).
110. See generally id
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efficiency,'1 ' the BankTrack report also outlined several specific
critiques that should be kept in mind when reviewing the actual content
of the proposed EP III.
The EPA's Strategic Review Board was developed as an
internal review process aimed at making productive recommendations
for the next version of the Equator Principles.11 2 This Strategic Review
Board was tasked with reviewing the state of the finance industry and
the existing standards in an attempt to maintain the EPs' international
prominence. 13  The Review Board's suggestions were in no way
binding on the EPFIs or EPA, but they nonetheless provided insight by
a knowledgeable observer by which to gauge the progress and promise
of EP III. As the report states, "the time for change has come." 114 The
recommendations that these two groups made are coupled with the
proposed changes to the EPs in the EP III draft, representing the most
common sources of criticism surrounding the Equator Principles.
A. Transparency
A now-familiar criticism of the EPs is the lack of transparency
on both the EPFI and borrower level; BankTrack's report is no
different, with calls for increased transparency for both creditors and
borrowers. " 5 On the bank level, the report suggests new standards:
publicly-available targets for implementation once a new bank joins the
EPs; public information about the number of transactions and projects
screened under the EPs; third-party confirmation regarding compliance
with reporting guidelines; and information about what projects failed to
meet the requirements detailed in the EPs." 6  While EPFI's have
criticized these long-standing NGO requests as a "naive" understanding
111. Id. at3.
112. See generally Suellen Lazarus & Alan Feldbaum, Equator Principles Strategic
Review - Final Report, ENVTL. RESOURCE MGMT. at 1 (Feb. 17, 2011), available at
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/exec-
summaryappendix strategic-review report.pdf (outlining proposals made by the Strategic
Review Board). The Review Board was comprised of external consultants and guided by
the EPA's Steering Committee.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. van Gelder et al., supra note 109, at 5-6.
116. Id. at5.
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of how banks operate," l7 BankTrack maintains that public scrutiny is the
only way that EPFIs will truly fulfill the spirit of the EPs." 8 The EP
Association's Strategic Review report also highlights the need for
increased transparency and disclosure on the part of the EPFIs." 9
Increased transparency will not only bring about uniform
implementation among the various EPFIs, it will also help alleviate the
well-known problem of free-riders who pay mere lip service to the
Principles. 120
While the EP Association's Strategic Review did not discuss the
subject of project-level transparency and disclosure, 12 1 BankTrack's
own report contained numerous recommendations to improve the
interaction between the borrower and any affected populations. 122 In an
attempt to provide meaningful consultation and engagement, BankTrack
suggests EP III should require borrowers to: identify which of their
projects fall under the EPs; publicize any social or environmental
requirements in the loan covenants; provide detailed information
regarding available grievance mechanisms; and provide all social and
environmental reports to the public. 123 These suggestions are in line
with BankTrack's overall desire to make the EPs more responsive to the
communities that EPFI-funded projects affect.
The draft of EP III contains provisions aimed at both EPFIs and
borrowers. 124 For instance, "Principle 10: Reporting and Transparency"
requires all EPFIs to issue a report at least once a year detailing the
transactions the financial institution has reviewed and accepted as well
as the procedures in place to implement the EPs. 125 This requirement
still carries the dubious exception that concerns over client
confidentiality may limit such disclosures. 126 Projects that fall within
certain criteria 27 will require the borrower to report on the level of
117. O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 569.
118. van Gelder et al., supra note 109, at 6.
119. Lazarus & Feldbaum, supra note 112, at 5-6.
120. Id. at 5.
121. See generally id.
122. van Gelder et al., supra note 109, at 6-7.
123. Id. at 7.
124. Ashurst Alert, supra note 105, at 3.
125. EP III (Draft), supra note 1, at 8.
126. Id.
127. All category A and category B projects, in all countries, that emit over 100,000
tons of carbon dioxide annually. Id.
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greenhouse gas emissions that occur during the operational phase.'28
Borrowers for high- and medium-impact projects will also be required
to disclose to the public their assessment documentation, as well as
results from the stakeholder consultation process.'
29
B. Scope
One of the most significant recommendations in the BankTrack
report related to an extension of the scope of the EPs to cover additional
financial instruments such as corporate loans in addition to project
finance and advisory services. 130  BankTrack believes that traditional
project finance only covers a fraction of the international finance
business,'3 1 meaning that the beneficial impacts of the EPs are
significantly limited in reach. The EP Strategic Review also suggests a
broadening of the scope of the EPs to include corporate loans that use
fifty percent or more of the proceeds towards a single asset.'32 Both of
these reports' suggestions focus on bringing the EPs to a larger
percentage of the global finance market in an effort to positively
influence as many projects and populations as possible.
In line with these recommendations, the EP III draft extends the
scope of coverage' 33 to include project-related corporate 134 and bridge
loans. 135 To qualify for coverage, corporate loans must be for a single
project with a loan duration of at least two years, with a total loan
amount of at least $100 million, with an initial EPFI exposure of at least
$50 million, and under circumstances where the borrower has control of
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. van Gelder et al., supra note 109, at 11.
131. Id.
132. Lazarus & Feldbaum, supra note 112, at 8 (Recommendation 7).
133. EPIII (Draft), supra note 1, at 3.
134. The glossary of EP III defines project-related corporate loans as "corporate loans,
made to business entities . . related to a single Project ... where the Known Use of Proceeds
is related to a single Project" through: the lender using the revenues of the project to repay
the loan; the security for the loan being in the form of a corporate or parent company
guarantee; or documentation for the loan revealing that the majority of the loan is going to a
single project. Notably, general corporate purposes loans are not covered by EP III. Id. at
13.
135. Id. (defining bridge loans as "an interim loan given to a business until the longer
term stage of financing can be obtained." Id.
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the project.136 The requirements for bridge loans will depend on the
development stage of the project, but in general they must have a loan
duration of at least two years and an expectation to be refinanced
through standard project financing or a project-related corporate loan. 137
This extension of the EPs seems to incorporate the changes implored by
both the EP Strategic Review and BankTrack's report, and signifies a
significant expansion of the EPs to other areas of finance.
C. Environmental and Social Impacts
According to NGOs and outside observers, provisions
concerning environmental and social impacts are long overdue. The
BankTrack report offers a fairly detailed critique, with
recommendations that range from monitoring of greenhouse
emissions 138 to establishing target emission levels for funded projects. 139
Perhaps the most ambitious suggestion is a general prohibition on
funding certain types of projects deemed too harmful for success
mitigation under the EPs. 140 These prohibited projects include: new
coal-fired power plants; new coal, oil, or gas extraction projects; large-
scale hydroelectric plants; and nuclear energy plants. 14' The Strategic
Review does not mention environmental concerns beyond a general
desire to adopt a common approach to avoid widely varying
applications among EPFIs. 142 The fear is that, if the EPs merely adopt
vague standards or purely aspirational language, any meaningful
changes would be circumvented by creative efforts on the part of shady
borrowers or insincere lenders. The Strategic Review is similarly silent
in the area of social impacts, providing nothing more than a general
recommendation to incorporate human rights concerns into the EPs.
143
The BankTrack report focuses predominantly on the general issue of
human rights as well, 44 with the only particulars being an established
136. Id. at 2.
137. Id. at 3.
138. van Gelder et al., supra note 109, at 15.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id. at 14.
142. Lazarus & Feldbaum, supra note 112, at 9 (Recommendation 14).
143. Id.
144. van Gelder, supra note 109, at 15-16.
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grievance mechanism and a framework to guide banks when a due
diligence assessment is necessary. 45 The BankTrack report does not
detail what exactly would be necessary to constitute "due diligence,"
instead saying that a corresponding Human Rights Impact Assessment
should draw on "well-developed standards.' 46  In practice such due
diligence procedures would likely encompass impact assessments
regarding both environmental and social concerns.
The heightened attention paid to environmental and social
concerns is apparent from the very first page of the EP III draft, where
the Preamble includes: mention of climate impacts that should be
minimized, compensated for, or offset; a responsibility to undertake due
diligence procedures 147 to respect human rights; and a reiteration of the
EPFIs' commitment to not provide financing to borrowers who cannot
or will not follow the standards of EP 11I. 148 The Principles outlined in
EP III have themselves undergone a change, as evidenced by the
variations in the names of the Principles. While these changes may
appear somewhat superficial, they seem to evidence a heightened
commitment to environmental and social guardianship among the
EPFIs. The draft of EP III also contains the words "human rights" for
the first time (referencing the EPs responsibility to respect human
rights) 149 and includes language focused on employing due diligence to
prevent negative impacts on the rights of affected populations.
150
An additional change to the substance of the Equator Principles
is in Principle 5's increased focus on "Stakeholder Engagement" rather
than the ambiguous "Consultation and Disclosure." Instead of merely
notifying local populations that an extensive project was about to be
commenced, EP III seems to focus on a more interactive and
collaborative approach with local stakeholders and observers. One
persistent criticism of the EPs, as CEDHA's experience in Uruguay
145. Id. at 16.
146. Id.
147. "The EP provides financial institutions the required 'due diligence' framework to
identify, assess and manage project impacts by defining the processes and standards for
stakeholder engagement with affected communities (including for Indigenous Peoples),
labor rights, and occupational and community health and safety." Frequently Asked
Questions on the Equator Principles (EP 111) Update, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS'N,
http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/EPIIIFAQS.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
148. EPIII (Draft), supra note 1, at 2.
149. Id.
150. Ashurst Alert, supra note 105, at 3.
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suggests, is that there is not a consistent level of consultation and
involvement between affected populations and the borrowers who
construct the projects financed under the EPs. The draft states that EP
Ill-bound projects that fall under high-impact Category A (or, in certain
circumstances, medium-impact Category B) will require the borrower to
conduct stakeholder engagement with any affected populations.'
51
These consultations must be geared to the affected population, with
appropriate cultural and lingual allowances.1 52  Most interesting is a
requirement that for certain projects in developing countries the
borrower must obtain actual "free, prior, and informed consent" from
indigenous populations before beginning work on projects that have
adverse effects on the local population.1 3 The text is silent as to what
exact methods or formalities are required to obtain this consent. This
change marks a significant development in the EPs, as it allows affected
populations to control their own destinies and development. Another
point of emphasis in Principle 5 of EP III is that the stakeholder
consultation process should be free of coercion or intimidation,
hopefully allowing for a more open dialogue between borrowers and the
people they affect.
154
V. A LOOK BACK
This Note began with a case study involving a paper pulp mill in
Uruguay that was built over the objections of the local population and
NGOs; it will serve a comparative function to examine that event briefly
through the changes reflected in EP III. One obvious point of emphasis
that has not changed since the original EP I is the fact that the EPs are
not meant to create any legal obligations or liability on behalf of either
the EPFI or the borrower. 155 Similarly, there is no requirement for an
EPFI to withdraw funding from a project for failure to follow the
EPs. 156 The latest edition of the EPs, however, does contain important




155. The disclaimer at the end of the EP III draft states, in part, that the EPs "do not
create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private." Id. at 9.
156. Principle 8 of EP III states that where "a borrower is not in compliance with its
environmental and social covenants, the EPFI will work with the borrower on remedial
measures." EPIII (Draft), supra note 1, at 7-8.
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and necessary mechanisms to help affected populations engage with the
borrowers and the financial institutions that finance their projects.
The first place where the affected populations of Uruguay and
Argentina would benefit is from EP III's consultation requirements.
Principle 5 mandates that the borrower conduct a respectful consultation
process with stakeholders free of intimidation or coercion. 5 7 In the
case of the Uruguayan paper pulp mill this requirement would mean that
the populations of both countries would have a chance to air their
concerns and protests in a forum tailored to their needs. If the proposed
project affected indigenous people, then they potentially could withhold
consent, though the text of the EP is silent regarding the process that
would follow such a move. 158  The presumption is that a local
population's stubborn refusal to consent to a project would result in the
project being reimagined or even relocated.
Another area in which EP III has built upon the failings of its
predecessors is the grievance mechanism available to stakeholders and
populations.1 59 While this assurance is noticeably without any method
of enforcement, it still presents a venue from which affected persons
can air their particular issues with the ongoing project. This mechanism
is to be publicized to potential affected communities during the
consultation process, 160 and would ideally create a dialogue between the
population and borrower that might resolve misunderstandings.
VI. THE EQUATOR DECADE
Nearly ten years have passed since the first adoption of the
Equator Principles, and the recent release of the EP III draft provides a
useful reference point in evaluating past progress as well as future
potential. The initial step in reviewing the efficacy of the EPs is
determining what exactly constitutes success or failure under the
voluntary framework. Different stakeholders, from NGOs to local
affected populations to large international lending institutes, all have
different expectations about what the Equator Principles can accomplish
as well as alternative viewpoints about the impact the EPs have had on
157. Id. at 6.
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international project finance. Looking forward, it is useful to examine
alternative approaches and regimes for handling social and
environmental concerns. Only by examining the full picture can a
useful evaluation of the EPs be accomplished.
Many EPFIs and outside observers look at the very existence of
the Equator Principles as a success. 61 After the withdrawal of the IMF
and World Bank from project lending in the 1990s, 62 many NGOs felt
that private banks would pursue profits ruthlessly with little concern for
the impacts on local populations.1 63 The voluntary adoption of the EPs
by these same banks was initially heralded as a triumph, even amongst
normally skeptical NGOs and environmental groups.' 64 In this line of
thinking, the EPs' continued spread to additional banks and other areas
of finance is certainly a success, and EP III's additional requirements
concerning climate impact and borrower involvement mark further steps
in a gradual, yet positive, evolution in the financial world. EPFIs view
the EPs as a way to improve bad projects through responsible corporate
governance and manage the various risks associated with lending,
1 65
meaning that the success of the EPs can be tied directly to the number
of banks and projects that fall under their purview. Even the most
skeptical NGO would admit that the adoption and implementation of the
EPs, at a minimum, has raised the level of awareness concerning social
and environmental impacts of the projects financed under the EPs.' 66
Once again, the definition of success is not fixed or agreed upon,
leaving many observers to decry the EPs as a goal in themselves.
While EPFIs have touted the steady spread of the Equator
Principles as a sign of their Success, 167 others have instead pointed to the
low opportunity cost that banks incur by signing on to the EPs 168 as an
indication that they are designed to be touted rather than truly
transformative. NGOs feel that the initial signatory banks developed
the EPs as a result of public pressure and outcry rather than from some
161. See O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 568.
162. Conley & Williams, supra note 46, at 543.
163. See O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 562.
164. van Gelder, supra note 109, at 2.
165. Macve & Chen, supra note 11, at 898-99.
166. Id. at 898.
167. Conley & Williams, supra note 46, at 562-63.
168. O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 570-7 1.
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altruistic desire to achieve more just business practices. 169 These
NGOs initially greeted the EPs with enthusiasm and optimism, but they
have been disappointed by the fact that banks are not publicly decrying
and distancing themselves from troublesome perspective projects. 170
These outside observers hoped that the EPs would become a weapon,
designed to eliminate the funding of impactful projects and promote the
protection of local populations; instead they view the EPs as a banker's
fagade, designed to provide cover to EPFIs while they continue to make
money from objectionable projects. 171
Even if the Equator Principles do not realize the lofty
expectations of NGOs and outside observers, the question still remains:
is there a better framework for achieving sustainable project financing
in developing countries? Several alternative programs have emerged
since the EPs conception in 2003, and these voluntary efforts may
provide a better arrangement for both lenders and stakeholders. 172 One
prominent example is the United Nations' Principles for Responsible
Investment Initiative (UN PRIs) that was developed in 2005.73 This
initiative currently has over 1,000 financial institutes as signatories, and
provides an opportunity for banks and other lending agencies to co-opt
the well-known United Nations brand for their own self-promotion.
74
The UN PRIs focuses on six principles 175 (not to be confused with the
Equator Principles) regarding environmental, social, and corporate
governance (ESG) that signatories must adopt. 76 With over $30 trillion
in combined assets,' 77 the size and depth of this initiative means that
169. See id. at 564-65.
170. van Gelder, supra note 109, at 2-3.
171. Id.
172. See Nazari, supra note 6.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. The six UN PRI Principles are: (1) To incorporate ESG issues into investment
analysis and decision-making processes; (2) To be active owners and incorporate ESG
issues into ownership policies and practices; (3) To seek appropriate disclosure on ESG
issues from companies in which they invest; (4) To promote acceptance and implementation
of the Principles within the investment industry; (5) To work together to enhance
effectiveness under the Principles; (6) To report on activities and progress towards
implementing the Principles; See Principles for Investors in Inclusive Finance, PRINCIPLES
FOR RESPONSIBLE INV., available at http://www.unpri.org/principles/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2013).
176. See id.
177. Nazari, supra note 6.
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any measurable impact is sure to be felt in a wide and diverse range of
projects and countries. However, the UN PRIs carry the familiar
disclaimer common in soft law: "There are no legal or regulatory
sanctions associated with the Principles. They are designed to be
voluntary and aspirational.' ' 178 Similar to the Equator Principles, the
UN PRIs do not carry any enforcement power beyond reputational risk
and public shaming.
The United Nations has also focused on a nation-based approach
to environmental and social responsibility through its Rio +20
initiative. 179 Rio +20 was a conference on sustainable development held
in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012 that focused on the dual themes of (1)
eradicating poverty while creating a green economy, and (2)
establishing an institutional framework to achieve that goal. 8° The
seven priority areas for Rio +20 were "decent jobs, energy, sustainable
cities, food security and sustainable agriculture, water, oceans, and
disaster readiness.'' It was the hope of Rio +20's organizers that the
conference would prompt countries to pursue sustainable methods of
development in their own countries and through their own legal
systems. This approach, while another example of soft law, is perhaps
the most viable method of enforcing responsible practices, since it will
influence the legal systems of sovereign countries to regulate projects
and development within their borders.
VII. CONCLUSION
To many observers the introduction of the Equator Principles in
2003 represented the hope that the standards would "help safeguard the
rights and interest of local stakeholders and protect the environment,
while also leading to increased, sustainable business opportunities."'
' 82
178. FAQs, PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INv., available at http://www.unpri.org/about-
pri/faqs/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (the disclaimer is located under the question "What
happens if we sign but find it difficult to comply?").
179. About Rio+20, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON SUSTAINABLE INV., available at
http://www.uncsd2012.org/about.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Bold Steps Forward: Towards Equator Principles that Deliver to People and the
Planet, BANKTRACK 2 (Jan. 2010),
http://www.banktrack.org/download/bold steps forward/1001 14_civil_societycall equator
_principles.pdf (reporting on the status of the Equator Principles from the view of an outside
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While many NGOs and others complained about shortcomings such as a
lack of transparency or enforcement mechanisms, 183 it was hoped that
the EPs would develop more effective procedures as they were
developed and refined. Now, nine years after the initial launch of EP I,
it seems that many of the initial concerns have been addressed. EPFIs
must now issue reports at least once a year that detail the ways they use
and implement the EPs. In addition, borrowers are forced, through loan
covenants in the finance documentation, to comply with EP
requirements concerning climate impact, stakeholder engagement, and
Action plans. These improvements to the EPs mean that a public
shaming campaign such as the one CEDHA implemented in Uruguay
would have more information as ammunition, as well as additional
avenues to contact and interact with the project borrowers themselves.
That said, one glaring complaint remains: the Equator Principles don't
actually force EPFIs to do anything. There is no "delisting"
mechanism, nor is there any civil or criminal liability attached to a
failure to implement the EPs. This means that an EPFI who chooses to
endure public criticism is still free to selectively implement the EPs in
whichever projects it sees fit, with no real method of recourse available
to affected populations. While large, prominent international banks
probably will forgo the public relations headache associated with "free-
riding" on the EPs, there is nothing to stop smaller financial institutions
in developing countries from doing just that.
As many NGOs have feared from the beginning, 184 the only
method of holding EPFIs accountable is through public pressure and
shaming. It is unlikely that large international financial institutions,
committed to earning profits for their shareholders above all else, would
volunteer to open themselves up to legal liability or forced disclosures
of internal business decisions. In such a corporate environment it is
doubtful that the EPs will ever be more than a framework that
ultimately helps EPFIs make business decisions rather than a tool that
directly aids vulnerable people and places. This failure may ultimately
be attributed to the inherent shortcomings in "soft law" governance,
which operates in the regulatory space between wholly individual,
observer).
183. Id.
184. See O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, supra note 9, at 572-73.
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voluntary action and uniform, legally mandated regulation. ' 15 It is
possible that future programs by the United Nations and other
supranational organizations may carry more enforcement power, but it
seems that the Equator Principles have reached their practical limit in
forcing international banks to comply with their social and
environmental obligations.
JOSHUA A. LANCE
185. Macve &Chen, supra note 11, at 911.
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